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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal transferred from the 
Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2005). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue No, 1: Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment 
holding that Utah's nonprofit corporations act did not apply to the plaintiff nonprofit 
corporation in this case, and that the mail-in vote on the claimed special assessment that 
is the subject of this case was valid notwithstanding that the results admittedly were not 
unanimous as required by Utah's nonprofit corporations act. 
Standard of Review: "We review a trial court's summary judgment ruling for 
correctness and afford no deference to its legal conclusions." Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 
UT 95 U 5, 61 P.3d 989, 991 (quoting Utah Coal & Lumber v. Outdoor Endeavors 
Unlimited, 2001 UT 100519, 40 P.3d 581) (internal quotations omitted). 
Demonstration that Issue No, 1 Was Preserved in the District Court: This 
issues of the application of Utah's nonprofit corporations act to plaintiff and the resulting 
statutory invalidity of the subject mail-in vote was one of the principal arguments briefed 
and argued to the district court by Defendants-Appellants Lawrence K. Deppe and Judith 
S. Deppe (the "Deppes"). E.g., R. 0385-0389 (pp. 1-5 of "Defendants' Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Cross-Motion 
for Summary Judgment" ("Deppes' Initial Summary Judgment Memo")); R. 0425-
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0427 (pp. 1-4 of "Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment" ("Deppes' Summary Judgment Reply Memo"); R. 0502-0503 
(Summary Judgment Hearing Transcript, at pp. 12-16). 
Issue No, 2: Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment ruling 
the Deppes were the owners of the subject condominium unit at the time the claimed 
special assessment that is the subject of this case purportedly was levied, who therefore 
could be held liable for the claimed assessment under Utah's condominium ownership 
act, failing to apply the doctrine of equitable conversion. 
Standard of Review: "We review a trial court's summary judgment ruling for 
correctness and afford no deference to its legal conclusions." Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 
UT 95 1J5, 61 P.3d 989, 991 (quoting Utah Coal & Lumber v. Outdoor Endeavors 
Unlimited, 2001 UT 100, f 9, 40 P.3d 581) (internal quotations omitted). 
Demonstration that Issue No. 2 was Preserved in the District Court: 
Application of the doctrine of equitable conversion and applicable statutory law to this 
case to show the Deppes were not the owners of the subject condominium unit when the 
claimed special assessment purportedly was levied, and therefore as a matter of statutory 
law they were not liable to pay any part of the claimed assessment even if it was valid, 
were among the principal arguments briefed and argued by the Deppes in the district 
court. E.g., R. 0367-0368 & 0384-0385 (Deppes' Initial Summary Judgment Memo, pp. 
5-8); R 0429-0430 (Deppes' Summary Judgment Reply Memo, pp. 6-7); R. 0502-0503 
(Summary Judgment Hearing Transcript, at p. 11). 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES AND RULES 
The following determinative statutes are applicable to this appeal:1 
Utah Code § 16-6-33 (1999 Repl.) (repealed by SB 61, 2000 Gen. Sess., 
effective April 30,2001): 
Any action required by this act to be taken at a meeting of the 
members or trustees of a nonprofit corporation, or any action 
which may be taken at a meeting of the members or trustees may 
be taken without a meeting if a consent in writing, setting forth 
the action so taken, shall be signed by all of the members entitled 
to vote with respect to the subject matter thereof, or all of the 
trustees, as the case may be. 
Utah Code § 16-6-22(12) (1999 Repl.): 
Each nonprofit corporation shall have power: ... (12) To make 
and alter bylaws, or resolutions, not inconsistent with its articles 
of incorporation or with the laws of this state, for the 
administration and regulation of the affairs of the corporation. 
Utah Code § 57-8-35(1) (Supp. 2000): 
The provisions of this chapter shall be in addition and 
supplemental to all other provisions of law, statutory or judicially 
declared, provided that wherever the application of the provisions 
of this chapter conflict with the application of such other 
provisions, this chapter shall prevail.... 
Utah Code § 57-8-20(2) (1986): 
The amount of common expenses assessed against each unit is a 
debt of the owner at the time the assessment is made and is 
1
 There is no dispute that the statutes determinative of this appeal are those that were in 
place when the mail-in vote that is the subject of this appeal was taken, i.e., those that 
were in effect in the fall of the year 2000. See e.g., R. 0388-0389 (Deppes' Initial 
Summary Judgment Memo, pp. 1-2 (so explaining, and uncontested by plaintiff)). 
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collectible as such. ... If any unit owner fails or refuses to make 
any payment of the common expenses when due, that amount 
constitutes a lien on the interest of the owner in the property, and 
upon the recording of notice of lien by the manager or 
management committee it is a lien upon the unit owner's interest 
in the property .... 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Plaintiff-Appellee Park West Condominium Association, Inc. (the "Association") 
brought this action seeking, against the Deppes, to enforce a claimed special assessment 
(the "Claimed Assessment") that the Association purportedly levied against a 
condominium unit previously owned by the Deppes (the "Subject Condo"). 
The Deppes answered denying any liability for the Claimed Assessment on several 
bases, including: 
1. That the Claimed Assessment was statutorily void, invalid, and of no 
force or effect because the mail-in vote conducted by the Association purportedly 
approving the Claimed Assessment did not comply with the requirement of Utah's 
nonprofit corporations act that votes conducted by mail must receive unanimous 
approval; and 
2. That pursuant to the doctrine of equitable conversion the Deppes were not 
the "owner" of the Subject Condo when the Claimed Assessment purportedly was 
levied, and therefore as a matter of statutory law were not liable to pay the Claimed 
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Assessment even if it was valid, because they had already by then entered into a 
binding contract for the sale of the Subject Condo. 
The Deppes also filed a counterclaim against the Association and a cross-claim 
against their co-defendant Bryan T. Morgan who had purchased the Subject Condo from 
the Deppes prior to the levy of the Claimed Assessment. 
The Association and the Deppes filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the 
Association's claims.2 The Association sought to enforce the Claimed Assessment and a 
purported Assumption Agreement relating to the Claimed Assessment. The Deppes 
sought to have the Claimed Assessment and the purported Assumption Agreement 
declared void, invalid, and otherwise unenforceable as against them as a matter of law. 
On August 26, 2005, the district court entered a "Minute Entry" ruling on the 
parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. That Minute Entry expressly provided 
that it was the court's order on the cross-motions and that no further order was necessary. 
That Minute Entry is therefore referred to hereinafter as the "Order." 
The district court's Order, a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum No. 1, 
ruled that the Assumption Agreement referenced by the Association does not create any 
The Association originally filed a motion for summary judgment on December 31, 
2002. Proceedings on that motion were voluntarily stayed by the parties pending 
conducting certain discovery. The Association later retained different legal counsel and 
filed a second summary judgment motion dated May 5, 2005, without any disposition 
having been made of its 2002 motion. The Association's motion dated May 5, 2005 was 
largely a repeat of its original 2002 motion (hereafter in this brief all references to the 
Association's motion mean, refer to, and include both its 2002 and its 2005 motions). 
Deppes therefore submitted one memorandum in opposition to the Association's motion, 
and in support of a cross-motion for summary judgment that they also filed. The district 
court's order that is the subject of this appeal was the ruling on the Association's motion 
and the Deppes' cross-motion. 
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obligation of the Deppes to pay the Claimed Assessment. (Addendum No. 1 hereto, R. 0445 
(Order, p. 12)). That ruling has not been appealed by the Association and therefore stands. 
The district court's Order, however, also included each of the following rulings: 
1. That notwithstanding the mail-in vote admittedly did not comply with the 
requirements of Utah's nonprofit corporations act, the Claimed Assessment was 
nevertheless valid because the mail-in vote on the Claimed Assessment was 
purportedly allowed by the Association's internal rules and bylaws; the district court 
effectively ruled that the Association could contract around the express 
requirements of Utah's nonprofit corporations act (Addendum No. 1 hereto, 
R. 0443-0444 (Order, pp. 10-11)); and 
2. That the Deppes were the "owner" of the Subject Condo when the 
Claimed Assessment purportedly was levied, and were therefore obligated to pay 
the Claimed Assessment, notwithstanding that they admittedly had contracted to sell 
the Subject Condo prior to that time; the district court simply ignored the doctrine of 
equitable conversion that governs in Utah (Addendum No. 1 hereto, R. 0444 (Order, 
P . l i)). 
Each of these rulings in the district court's Order is incorrect as a matter of law and 
is the subject of this appeal. 
II. Statement of Facts 
There was and is no dispute as to any of the following material facts. In addition 
to the other record support noted below for each referenced fact, all record citations 
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below to "R. 0403" are to paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Association's combined summary 
judgment opposition and reply memorandum in which the Association expressly stated 
that did not dispute the referenced facts. 
1. The Association is a nonprofit corporation which operates a condominium 
project located in Park City, Summit County, Utah, historically known as the Park West 
Condominiums Project ("Park West Condominiums"). {See e.g., R. 0002 
(Association's Complaint, \ 3); R.0058 (Association's Amended Complaint, f 2)). 
2. The Deppes previously owned a certain condominium unit (the "Subject 
Condo") within the Park West Condominiums. {See e.g., R. 0398 (Deppes' Initial 
Summary Judgment Memo, f 7 of Deppes' Statement of Material Facts, and the materials 
cited therein and attached thereto); R. 0403). 
3. In the year 2000, the Association was considering making substantial 
renovations to the Park West Condominiums, and decided to try to obtain the approval of 
the Association's members to levy a proposed special assessment (identified and referred 
to above, and hereinafter, as the "Claimed Assessment" that is the subject of this appeal) 
to pay the costs of the contemplated improvements. {See e.g., R. 0397 (Deppes' Initial 
Summary Judgment Memo, ffl[ 8-9 of Deppes' Statement of Material Facts, and the 
materials cited therein and attached thereto); R. 0403). 
4. Unable to obtain the required quorum to hold a vote at a meeting of 
Association members, the Association instead subsequently ignored the nonprofit 
corporation act pursuant to which they were incorporated and chose to conduct a vote on 
the Claimed Assessment by mail-in ballot, relying upon the following provision 
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appearing in Article XXVIII of the Association's 1981 Amended Condominium 
Declaration for Park West Condominiums regarding consent in lieu of a vote at a 
meeting: 
In any case in which the Act or this Declaration requires the vote of a stated 
percentage of the Project's undivided ownership interest for authorization 
or approval of a transaction, such requirement may be fully satisfied by 
obtaining, with or without a meeting, consents in writing to such 
transaction from Unit Owners who collectively hold at least the stated 
percentage of undivided ownership interest. 
(See e.g., R. 0396-0398 (Deppes' Initial Summary Judgment Memo, 1fl[ 8-12 of Deppes' 
Statement of Material Facts, and the materials cited therein and attached thereto); 
R. 0403). 
5. The vote on the Claimed Assessment was held only by the Association's 
chosen mail-in ballot procedure, and was not held at any meeting of Association 
members. (See e.g., R. 0396-0397 (Deppes' Initial Summary Judgment Memo, ^ 12 of 
Deppes' Statement of Material Facts, and the materials cited therein and attached 
thereto); R. 0403). 
6. According to the Association's own official vote tally, 17% of the 
Association's members who were entitled to vote (including the Deppes) did not cast any 
vote at all on the Claimed Assessment, and another 19% of those who did vote voted 
against the imposition of the Claimed Assessment. (See e.g., R. 0395 (Deppes' Initial 
Summary Judgment Memo, ^ 18 & 19 of Deppes' Statement of Material Facts, and the 
materials cited therein and attached thereto); R. 0403). 
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7. Ignoring the nonprofit corporation code, the Association nevertheless 
declared the Claimed Assessment was approved and passed, claiming that a simple 
majority approval was all that was needed under Article XVIII of the Association's 1981 
Amended Condominium Declaration for Park West Condominiums which states: 
In assessing Unit Owners, for capital improvements, no assessment for a 
single improvement in the nature of a capital expenditure exceeding the 
sum of $10,000.00 shall be made without the same having been first voted 
on and approved by at least a majority of the Project's undivided ownership 
interest. 
(R. 0395 & 0397 (Deppes' Initial Summary Judgment Memo, ffij 10 & 20-21 of Deppes' 
Statement of Material Facts, and the materials cited therein and attached thereto); 
R. 0403). 
8. On December 14, 2005, a "Notice of Special Assessment" was signed by 
the then-attorney for the Association (who was not a manager or member of the 
Management Committee), and which he then recorded with the Summit County 
Recorder's Office on December 15, 2004. (See e.g., R. 0395 (Deppes' Initial Summary 
Judgment Memo, % 20 of Deppes' Statement of Material Facts, and the materials cited 
therein and attached thereto); R. 0403). 
9. On or about January 20, 2001, the Association, through its authorized 
property manager, sent the Notice of Special Assessment to its members (and admittedly 
not to the Deppes) by certified mail, notifying members (and admittedly not the Deppes) 
of the Claimed Assessment and stating and confirming that the Claimed Assessment was 
effective as of December 14, 2000. (See e.g., R. 0394 & 0395 (Deppes' Initial Summary 
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Judgment Memo, fflj 21 & 25 of Deppes9 Statement of Material Facts, and the materials 
cited therein and attached thereto); R. 0403). 
10. The Claimed Assessment was to be paid in two installments, the first of 
which was to become due on February 28, 2001, and the second of which was to become 
due on June 28, 2001. (See e.g., R. 0394 (Deppes' Initial Summary Judgment Memo, 
Tf 26 of Deppes' Statement of Material Facts, and the materials cited therein and attached 
thereto); R. 0403). 
11. The work for the renovations for which the Claimed Assessment was 
purportedly levied did not commence until at least late-spring or early summer of 2001. 
(See e.g., R. 0394 (Deppes' Initial Summary Judgment Memo, TJ 27 of Deppes' Statement 
of Material Facts, and the materials cited therein and attached thereto); R. 0403). 
12. On December 13, 2000, the Deppes had entered into an irrevocable and 
binding contract to sell the Subject Condo to purchaser Bryan T. Morgan, executing 
Addendum 3 to the sales contract. (See e.g., R. 0395 (Deppes' Initial Summary 
Judgment Memo, f^ 22 of Deppes' Statement of Material Facts, and the materials cited 
therein and attached thereto); Addendum No. 1 hereto, R. 0437-0438 (Order, pp. 4-5, 
finding the execution of Addendum 3 on December 13, 2000, created a contract. The 
Association did not appeal that finding)). 
13. The Deppes signed a deed to Mr. Morgan on January 2, 2001, and that deed 
was recorded on January 5, 2001. (See e.g., R. 0394 (Deppes' Initial Summary Judgment 
Memo, U 23 of Deppes' Statement of Material Facts, and the materials cited therein and 
attached thereto); R. 0403). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The district court's ruling that the Deppes are liable for the Claimed Assessment 
that is the subject of this case is fatally flawed both in its conclusion that the Claimed 
Assessment was not void and invalid under Utah's nonprofit corporations act, and in its 
conclusion that the Deppes were the owners of the Subject Condo subject to liability for 
the Claimed Assessment even if it was valid. On each, or either, of these bases, this 
Court should reverse the district court's Order, and hold the Deppes are not liable to pay 
the Claimed Assessment. 
The district court erred in ruling that the Association's internal mail-in voting rules 
somehow trumped Utah's nonprofit corporations act and circumvented the requirement of 
that act that votes conducted by mail-in ballot be approved by the unanimous written 
consent of all of those members entitled to vote. Such a ruling is without support and is 
indeed contrary to established statutory and case law. It also is against public policy as it 
would allow nonprofit corporations to flagrantly circumvent express requirements of the 
corporate code with impunity, rendering the corporate code meaningless and useless. 
Having sought the protections of incorporating, the Association indisputably is subject to 
all requirements of the corporate code, and may not contract around them. Since the 
Claimed Assessment admittedly was not unanimously approved by all Association 
members as indisputably required by Utah's nonprofit corporations act, the Claimed 
Assessment is void and invalid under that act which governs this case. This Court should 
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therefore reverse the district court's Order and declare the Claimed Assessment void, 
invalid, and unenforceable as against the Deppes. 
The district court also erred in failing to apply the doctrine of equitable 
conversion. Pursuant to Utah statute, only the "owner" of a condominium unit may be 
held liable for a special assessment, like the Claimed Assessment that is the subject of 
this case, that is levied against the unit. By the time the Claimed Assessment was levied 
in this case, however, the Deppes had already entered into a binding written contract for 
the sale of the Subject Condo. Pursuant to the doctrine of equitable conversion which 
governs in Utah, the Deppes therefore were not the owners of the Subject Condo when 
the Claimed Assessment purportedly was levied. Accordingly, even if the Claimed 
Assessment was valid, which it was not, the Deppes were not "owners" subject to 
liability to pay it. This Court should therefore reverse the district court's Order and hold 
the Deppes free from liability for the Claimed Assessment. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE ASSOCIATION'S 
MAIL-IN VOTE ON THE CLAIMED ASSESSMENT THAT 
ADMITTEDLY DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
THE NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS ACT 
The mail-in vote upon the Claimed Assessment, and therefore the Claimed 
Assessment itself, was void, invalid, and ineffectual for failure to comply with the 
requirements of Utah's nonprofit corporations act. 
A. Utah's Nonprofit Corporations Act Applies to and Governs This Case, 
This Court has previously confirmed that by incorporating into a homeowners 
association, homeowners bind themselves to the requirements of Utah's nonprofit 
corporations act. E.g., Levangerv. Vincent, 2000 UT App 103 f 13, 3 P.3d 187, 189. 
Since the condominium owners in this case chose to incorporate into the Plaintiff 
Association, there are therefore two state statutes that apply to and govern this case - the 
Utah Condominium Ownership Act, as it was in effect when the subject vote was 
conducted in the year 2000, appearing at Utah Code §§ 57-8-1 through -38 (the 
"Condominium Act"), and the Utah Nonprofit Corporation and Co-operative 
Association Act as it was in effect at that same time, appearing at Utah Code §§ 16-6-18 
through -112 (the "Nonprofit Corporations Act"). 
In the year 2000, when the voting on and purported approval of the Claimed 
Assessment occurred, section 16-6-33 of the Nonprofit Corporations Act provided as 
follows: 
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Any action required by this act to be taken at a meeting of the 
members or trustees of a nonprofit corporation, or any action which may be 
taken at a meeting of the members or trustees may be taken without a 
meeting j / a consent in writing, setting forth the action so taken, shall be 
signed by all of the members entitled to vote with respect to the subject 
matter thereof or all of the trustees, as the case may be. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-33 (1999 Repl.) (repealed by SB 61, 2000 Gen. Sess., effective 
April 30, 2001) (emphasis added). Although the Utah Legislature repealed this provision 
in its 2000 General Session, the repeal of that provision and the imposition of the new 
statute, did not become effective until April 30, 2001. See UT Legis 300 (2000), § 235 
(setting effective date). Thus, at the time of the mail-in vote on the Claimed Assessment 
at issue in this case was conducted in the year 2000, the Nonprofit Corporations Act was 
very clear, and this Court has confirmed as shown below, that in order to approve any 
action by a mail-in vote all of the members entitled to vote must unanimously approve 
such action in writing. 
This Court has explained the relationship between the Condominium Act and the 
Nonprofit Corporations Act on more than one occasion. As explained in more detail 
below, this Court's prior rulings confirm the following points relevant to and dispositive 
of the instant case: 
1. The Nonprofit Corporations Act applies to condominium 
associations such as the Association in this case. 
2. Where the Condominium Act is silent, the provisions of the 
Nonprofit Corporations Act control. 
3. Because the voting procedures set forth in the Nonprofit 
Corporations Act protect the members' interests, they are mandatory, and strict 
compliance is required. 
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4. Pursuant to the Nonprofit Corporations Act, votes conducted by 
mail-in ballots must be unanimous to be valid. 
The first and second points were addressed in this Court's ruling in Reedeker v. 
Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). At issue there was whether the tort claims 
brought against certain past and present trustees of the American Towers Owners 
Association were governed solely by the Condominium Act or whether the Nonprofit 
Corporations Act's provision holding trustees liable only for intentional misconduct 
should be applied. Id. at 584-85. Recognizing that section 57-8-35(1) of the 
Condominium Act "specifically allows for application of other law within the 
condominium context," this Court held that because the Condominium Act was silent on 
the point, "the trustees of a condominium association incorporated as a nonprofit 
corporation under the Nonprofit Corporation Act are, pursuant to section 57-8-35(1) of 
the Condominium Act, subject to the liability provision contained within the Nonprofit 
Corporation Act." Id. at 585. 
Having established that the provisions of the Nonprofit Corporations Act apply 
where the Condominium Act is silent, in Levanger v. Vincent, 2000 UT App 103, 3 P.3d 
187, this Court addressed the third and fourth above-listed issues, which are at the heart 
of the instant case: that the unanimity requirement for mail-in voting under the Nonprofit 
Corporations Act, Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-33, must be strictly complied with. In 
Levanger, the plaintiffs were members of the Highland Estates Property Owners 
Association who sued the association's board of trustees seeking to have the court set 
aside amendments to the covenants, conditions, and restrictions ("CC&Rs") governing 
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the association's conduct. When the trustees could not obtain the required vote of the 
owners at the association's annual meeting, they decided that a mail-in ballot would be 
the best way to notify the homeowners of the proposed changes to the CC&Rs and 
maximize participation in the election. Id. Tflf 3-4. Of the 262 lot owners, 149 were in 
favor of the amendments, 26 were opposed to them, and 87 did not vote. Id. % 6. While 
the trial court concluded that this constituted a valid vote, this Court reversed, explaining: 
We conclude that, because the voting procedures [set forth in the 
Nonprofit Corporations Act] protect the members' interests, they are 
mandatory rather than directory and therefore strict compliance is 
required. Because the mail-in balloting procedure did not comply 
strictly with either the Act or the Association's by-laws, we conclude it 
was ineffectual. 
Id. at 1f 19. The Court therefore invalidated the amendments to the CC&Rs that 
were purportedly approved by the mail-in vote, because they were not approved 
by all members and therefore "lacked unanimous written consent [required under 
section 16-6-33 of the Nonprofit Corporations Act] in the absence of a 
shareholders meeting." Id. ffif 15 & 19. 
The same provisions and reasoning apply to invalidate the mail-in balloting on the 
Claimed Assessment in the instant case. Section 16-6-33 of the Nonprofit Corporation 
Act applies because the Condominium Act is silent as to the ability of an association to 
conduct mail-in voting. Section 16-6-33 clearly establishes that a mail-in vote must be 
unanimous. The mail-in vote in this case, however, admittedly was not unanimous - by 
the Association's own official tally, 17% of the Association's members who were entitled 
to vote (including the Deppes) did not vote at all, and another 19% of the Association's 
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members who did vote voted against the Claimed Assessments. Since the mail-in vote 
did not unanimously approve the Claimed Assessment, it did not strictly comply with 
section 16-6-33. Accordingly, the mail-in vote upon the Claimed Assessment, and 
therefore the Claimed Assessment itself, was void, invalid, and ineffectual. 
B. The District Court Erred in Holding the Mail-In Vote Was Valid 
Under the Association's Internal Mail-In Voting Rule. 
Ignoring the plain language of Utah Code Section 16-6-33 and this Court's 
Reedeker and Levanger precedents, the district court in this case ruled as follows: 
The Court is not persuaded by the Deppes argument that the Nonprofit Act 
and the Utah Condominium Ownership Act in effect in 2000 prohibited the 
mail in vote permitted by Article XXVIII of the 1981 Declaration. The 
Utah Condominium Ownership Act permits a condominium homeowners' 
association to create declarations. Where the declarations are silent, the 
Utah Condominium Ownership Act applies and where it is silent, then the 
Nonprofit Act applies. Here, the 1981 Declaration clearly permits a mail-in 
vote and does not require written consent signed by all members for the 
special assessment to occur without a meeting. Since the 1981 Declaration 
is not silent on the issue, the two Acts referred to by the Deppes never come 
into play on the issue of mail-in voting. The 1981 Declaration governs the 
mail-in vote on the assessment. (R. 0443-0444 (Order, pp. 10-11)). 
The district court, however, got its order of analysis precisely backward, 
effectively ruling that nonprofit corporations may trump and circumvent the express and 
unequivocal requirements of the Nonprofit Corporations Act by contracting around them 
through adoption of inconsistent declarations, articles, or bylaws. Not only would 
upholding the district court's decision be bad public policy, completely neutering the 
entire corporate code and rendering it completely useless, meaningless, and without any 
force or effect, it would also be contrary to governing law. Deppes have found no 
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reported case in the entire country that has held, as the district court's Order in this case 
holds, that a nonprofit corporation may circumvent the express and unequivocal 
requirements of the corporate code, whether by adoption of inconsistent declarations, 
articles, bylaws, or otherwise. To the contrary, it is well-settled that the preeminent 
authority over a corporation is the state statutes under which it is created, and that all 
articles of incorporation, bylaws, declarations, and other policies and documents of a 
corporation are inferior and subject to, and must conform to, the requirements of such 
statutes. See e.g., Harding v. Heritage Health Products Co., 98 P.3d 945 (Colo. App. 
2004) (holding corporation's bylaws void where inconsistent with state law); Lange v. 
Lange, 520 N.W. 2d 113 (Iowa 1994) (corporation is restricted to bylaws that are not 
inconsistent with state law); Swanger v. NationalJuvenile Law Center, 714 S.W. 2d 170 
(Mo. App. 1986) (holding corporation's bylaw void where inconsistent with statute's 
superior statutory authority); In re Oceanside Properties, Inc., 14 B.R. 95, 104-105 
(Bkrtcy, Hi. 1981) (corporate bylaws are "the lowest element of a three tired hierarchy; 
[t]he corporation law is at the top, then come the articles of incorporation, then the by-
laws. The lowest tier cannot be inconsistent with either of the higher tiers."). 
Utah adheres to the principle that statutory provisions are superior to corporate 
documents and that corporate documents must comport with the governing statutes. 
Section 16-6-22(12) of the Nonprofit Corporations Act expressly provided at the time of 
the vote on the Claimed Assessment at issue in this case that nonprofit corporations, such 
as the Association in this case, have power only "To make and alter bylaws, or 
resolutions, not inconsistent with its articles of incorporation or with the laws of this 
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state, for the administration and regulation of the affairs of the corporation." Utah Code 
Ann. § 16-6-22(12) (1999 Repl.) (repealed by SB 61, 2000 Gen. Sess., effective April 30, 
2001) (emphasis added). 
Article XVIII of the Association's internal rules and bylaws, which purports to 
authorize less than unanimous mail-in voting, on its face is inconsistent with the 
Nonprofit Corporations Act which, as noted above, at the time of the vote at issue in this 
case expressly authorized approval of actions to be obtained by mail-in voting only "if... 
all of the members entitled to vote with respect to the subject matter thereof approve of 
the measure at issue. Utah Code § 16-6-33 (1999) (emphasis added). Article XVIII, 
therefore, is invalid as a matter of law. 
Rather than beginning and ending its analysis looking only at the provisions of the 
Association's internal rules on mail-in voting, as the district court improperly did, the 
following is the analysis that this Court must follow: 
1. Although not legally required to do so, the Association indisputably chose to 
and did incorporate as a nonprofit corporation. 
2. As a matter of law, "by incorporating into a homeowners association, the 
homeowners bound themselves to the requirements of Utah's Nonprofit 
Corporations statute." Levanger v. Vincent, 2000 UT App 103 ^ f 13, 3 P.3d 
187, 189. 
3. Utah's Nonprofit Corporations Act as it read at the time of the vote upon the 
Claimed Assessment stated that nonprofit corporations may approve actions 
without a meeting of its members only "if a consent in writing, setting forth 
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the action so taken, shall be signed by all of the members entitled to vote 
with respect to the subject matter thereof." Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-33 (1999 
Repl.) (repealed by SB 61, 2000 Gen. Sess., effective April 30, 2001) 
(emphases added). 
4. The fact that the Association also is subject to the requirements of Utah's 
Condominium Act does not excuse it from compliance with the Nonprofit 
Corporations Act or allow it to adopt articles, bylaws, declarations, rules, or 
anything else inconsistent with the Nonprofit Corporations Act. Having 
chosen to incorporate as a nonprofit corporation, the Association must 
comply with both the Utah Condominium Act and the Nonprofit 
Corporations Act. Utah Code § 57-8-35(1) (stating provisions of Utah's 
Condominium Act "shall be in addition and supplemental to all other 
provisions of law, statutory or judicially declared"). See also e.g., Reedeker 
v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577, 585 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (confirming 
condominium owners' association was subject to the requirements of the 
Nonprofit Corporations Act "in addition to" those of the Utah Condominium 
Act). 
5. The Association admittedly chose to conduct a mail-in vote on the Claimed 
Assessment, rather than holding a vote at a meeting of its members. 
6. The Association's mail-in vote conducted on the Claimed Assessment 
indisputably did not win the approval of "a//" members, and therefore the 
mail-in vote on the Claimed Assessment and the Claimed Assessment itself 
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"was ineffectual" as a matter of law because it "did not strictly comply with 
the [Nonprofit Corporations] Act's requirement of unanimous written 
consent." Levanger, 2000 UT App 103 at ^ 15 & 19, 3 P.3d at 190 & 191 
(holding Nonprofit Corporation Act's provisions regarding voting procedures 
protect members' interests and are therefore "mandatory ... and therefore 
strict compliance is required"; invalidating a homeowners association's mail-
in vote on approval of amendments to CC&Rs because it was not approved 
by all members and therefore "lacked unanimous written consent [as required 
under section 16-6-33 of the Nonprofit Corporations Act] in the absence of a 
shareholders meeting"). 
This Court should therefore reverse the district court's Order which improperly 
held the Nonprofit Corporations Act did not apply to this case and which therefore 
purported to validate the Association's fatally-defective non-unanimous mail-in vote 
which was inconsistent with and in circumvention of the Nonprofit Corporations Act. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THE DEPPES WERE THE 
OWNERS OF THE SUBJECT CONDO AT THE TIME OF THE CLAIMED 
ASSESSMENT, FAILING TO APPLY THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE 
CONVERSION 
Even if the Claimed Assessment was valid, which it was not as shown above, the 
district court's ruling that the Deppes are liable to pay it as the "owner" of the Subject 
Condo is in error. At the time the Claimed Assessment purportedly was made, the 
Condominium Act expressly provided: 
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The amount of common expenses assessed against each unit is a debt of the 
owner at the time the assessment is made and is collectible as such. [Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-8-20(2) (1986) (emphasis added)]. 
In this case, the Association itself stated the effective date of the Claimed 
Assessment was December 14, 2000, and that was the date on which the Association 
recorded the Notice of Special Assessment with the Summit County Recorder's Office. 
The undisputed facts of this case, however, show, and the district court properly held, that 
by then the Deppes had already entered into a valid and binding contract for the sale of 
the Subject Condo, on December 13, 2000. The district court's ruling that the Deppes 
nevertheless were the "owner" of the Subject Condo when the Claimed Assessment was 
made on December 14, 2000, purportedly because the sale did close until January 5, 
2001, when the Deppes' deed was recorded because "the Deppes retained possession and 
bore the risk of loss on the unit" until then, improperly ignores the doctrine of equitable 
conversion that governs in Utah. 
In Utah the doctrine of equitable conversion provides that once parties enter into 
an enforceable contract for the sale of property, title to the property equitably passes to 
the buyer who is then treated as the owner even though the deed conveying legal title 
may not be delivered until later. Cannefax v. Clement, 818 P.2d 546, 550-51 (Utah 
1991). The district court's correct and unchallenged finding that the Deppes had a 
contract to sell the Subject Condo on December 13, 2000, as a matter of law is all that is 
required for the doctrine of equitable conversion to apply. Pursuant to that doctrine, as a 
matter of law Bryan T. Morgan became the owner of the Subject Condo on December 13, 
2000, when, as the district court found, a binding contract was reached. It was Bryan T. 
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Morgan, therefore, who was the owner of the Subject Condo when the Claimed 
Assessment purportedly was levied on December 14, 2000, not the Deppes. As a matter 
of law, therefore, pursuant to Section 57-8-20(2) of the Condominium Act, even if the 
Claimed Assessment was validly made, it is a debt only of Bryan T. Morgan, the then 
owner of the Subject Condo, not of the Deppes. The district court's ruling that the 
Deppes were owners subject to the Claimed Assessment is in error, including for not 
applying the doctrine of equitable conversion. The district court's references in the Ordei 
to the Deppes having retained possession of the Subject Condo until final closing is 
legally irrelevant, including under the doctrine of equitable conversion, as is the district 
court's reference to who purportedly bore the risk of loss until closing, including since 
risk of loss relates only to damage or destruction of the premises which indisputably did 
not occur in this case. 
Additionally, the Utah Condominium Act at the time of the Claimed Assessment 
also provided that a lien against a condominium unit to secure an assessment could arise 
only: (i) "[i]f any unit owner fails or refuses to make any payment of the common 
expenses when due," and then only (ii) "upon the recording of notice of lien by the 
manager or management committee." Utah Code § 57-8-20(2) (1986) (emphases added). 
In this case the first instalment payment on the Claimed Assessment was not due until 
February 28, 2001. Regardless of whether one measures by the date of the Deppes' 
contract to sell the Subject Condo (December 13, 2000), the date the Deppes signed the 
deed conveying legal title to the Subject Condo (January 2, 2001), or the date the 
Deppes' deed conveying legal title was recorded (January 5, 2001), the first instalment 
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payment on the Claimed Assessment was not due until long after the Deppes had sold the 
Subject Condo to Bryan Morgan. Accordingly, there could not have been any failure or 
refusal by the Deppes to pay the assessment "when due" before the sale, because there 
was no portion of it "due" before the sale. Additionally, the notice of the Claimed 
Assessment that was recorded in the Summit County Recorder's Office (a copy of which 
from the district court record is attached hereto as Addendum No. 2) indisputably and on 
its face was signed by "James R. Blakesley, Attorney for Association" and was recorded 
by him, and not by the Association's manager or management committee as required by 
statute. Also, the claimed lien notice was premature in that it was recorded on 
December 15, 2000, before there even arguably could have been any failure to pay the 
Claimed Assessment "when due." The Association, therefore, cannot meet either of the 
two elements required for the existence of any lien securing the Claimed Assessment, 
particularly not any lien chargeable against the Deppes who sold the Subject Condo long 
before any part of the Claimed Assessment arguably became due. The Claimed 
Assessment is chargeable, if at all, only against the new owner, Bryan T. Morgan. 
This Court should reverse the district court's Order, hold the doctrine of equitable 
conversion must be applied to this case, and hold that the Deppes were not owners of the 
Subject Condo subject to any liability for the Claimed Assessment when it was made. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court's Order is in error on each of the issues addressed above. The 
Deppes therefore respectfully request this Court to reverse the district court, and declare 
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the Deppes are not liable in any way to pay any part of the Claimed Assessment that was 
void and ineffectual to begin with since the mail-in vote upon the Claimed Assessment 
did not obtain unanimous approval as required by the Nonprofit Corporations Act, and 
that in any event was not made nor due until long after the Deppes had already sold the 
Subject Condo. The Deppes respectfully request the Court to hear oral argument in this 
case, and to reverse the district court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / 7 dayofJanuary, 2006. 
Bradley L. T\\y 
Joan M. Andrews 
Fabian & Clendenin, PC 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants 
Lawrence K. Deppe and Judith S. Deppe 
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ADDENDUM NO. 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




BRYAN T. MORGAN, LAWRENCE K. : 
DEPPE AND JUDITH S. DEPPE, : 
Defendants. : 
: MINUTE ENTRY 
: Case No. 010500391 
: Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK 
August 26, 2005 
The above matter came before the court on August 15, 2002, 
for oral argument on Park West Condominium Association Inc. 
(Association) and Lawrence K. Deppe and Judith S. Deppe's 
(Deppes) cross motions for summary judgment.1 The Association 
was present through Denver C. Snuffer and Deppes were present 
through Bradley L. Tilt. 
FACTS 
The Deppes previously owned condominium unit #32B 
(condominium unit) within the Park West Condominiums project 
(Condominium Project) located at 1920 Canyon Resort Drive, #32B, 
in Park City, Summit County, Utah, near what is now known as The 
Canyons ski resort. The Association, comprised of members owning 
units in the condominium project, is the administrative body that 
controls, operates and manages the Condominium Project. 
1
 Additional parties not involved in the cross motions are 
not included or referred to in this decision. 
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On March 3, 1977, the Condominium Project's developer caused 
to be recorded a "Condominium Declaration for Park West 
Condominiums" (the 1977 Declaration) in the office of the County 
Recorder of Summit County as Entry No. 136576, in Book M90, at 
page 843. See Deppes Exhibit 1. 
On June 18, 1981, the Condominium Project's developer caused 
to be recorded an "Amended Condominium Declaration for Park West 
Condominiums" (the 1981 Declaration) in the office of the County 
Recorder of Summit County as Entry No. 180651, in Book M190, at 
page 142. See Deppes Exhibit 2. The 1981 Declaration 
incorporated by reference the By-Law of the Condominium Project, 
attached as Exhibit C and recorded at the same time. See Deppes 
Exhibit 3. 
On September 1, 1994, the Association caused to be recorded 
in the office of the County Recorder of Summit County an 
"Amendment to Declaration of Condominium for Park West 
Condominiums" (the 1994 Amendment) as Entry No. 00417267, in Book 
844, at page 462. See Deppes Exhibit 4. The 1994 Amendment, 
among other things, (1) transferred the control, operation and 
management of the Condominium Project from the developer to the 
Association and (2) amended and superceded Article VI of the 1981 
Declaration with the revisions set forth in the 1994 Amendment. 
During 1999 and 2000, the Association's Management Committee 
(Management Committee) was actively discussing the possibility of 
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making substantial improvements to the exterior of the 
Condominium Project. In September 2000, the Management Committee 
decided to try to obtain the approval of the Association's 
members to levy a proposed special assessment to cover the cost 
of the improvements over $10,000. The 1981 Declaration provides 
that no assessment for a single capital improvement greater than 
$10,000.00 shall be made without the assessment "having been 
first voted on and approved by at least a majority of the 
project's undivided ownership interest." See Deppes Exhibit 2 at 
17-18, Article XVIII. 
Article XXVIII of the 1981 Declaration addresses consent in 
lieu of a vote, which states: 
In any case in which the Act or this Declaration 
requires the vote of a stated percentage of the 
Project's undivided ownership interest for 
authorization or approval of a transaction, such 
requirement may be fully satisfied by obtaining with or 
without a meeting, consents in writing to such 
transaction from Unit owners who collectively hold at 
least the state percentage of undivided ownership 
interest. See Deppes Exhibit 2 at 26. 
A vote on the proposed special assessment that is the 
subject of this case (the claimed assessment) was not held at an 
annual or other special meeting of homeowners. Rather, the 
Association, by and through its Management Committee, decided to 
conduct the vote on the claimed assessment by mail-in vote, 
apparently pursuant to Article XXVIII, because it was too 
difficult to obtain the required quorum at a meeting. 
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According to the deposition testimony of Management 
Committee members Cynthia Calloway, Clark Stringham, Chris Nelson 
and Donna Van Buren of Greater Park City Properties handled the 
balloting for the claimed assessment and Greater Park City 
Properties was the official record keeper for the Association. 
Greater Park City Properties did all the mailing for the 
Association with respect to the ballot to vote on the claimed 
assessment. 
Greater Park City Properties mailed the ballot package to 
vote on the claimed assessment to Association members via United 
States mail on October 1, 2000. The ballot package, in part, 
requested that Association members return their votes on the 
completed ballots by November 15, 2000. See Deppes Exhibit 10. 
On November 19, 2000, the ballots were counted. According 
to the official tally maintained by the Association, the claimed 
assessment was approved by 64% of the Association members. See 
Deppes Exhibit 11. According to the Association's official 
tally, 19% opposed the claimed assessment and 17% of the 
Association's members, who were entitled to vote (including the 
Deppes) did not cast any vote at all on the proposed claimed 
assessment. Id. 
After trying to sell their condominium unit for two years, 
on December 13, 2000, the Deppes entered into a Real Estate 
Purchase Contract and Earnest Money Agreement to sell their 
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condominium unit to Bryan T. Morgan (Morgan). See Deppes Exhibit 
13, Addendum 3. 
The following day, on December 14, 2000, the Association 
caused to be recorded a "Notice' of Special Assessment" (Notice) 
in the office of the County Recorder of Summit County as Entry 
No. 00578640, in Book 01345, at page 01030. See Deppes Exhibit 
12. 
On January 2, 2001, the Deppes signed a warranty deed to 
Morgan for the condominium unit, which was recorded on January 5, 
2001, in the office of the County Recorder of Summit County as 
Entry No. 00579854, in Book 01348, at page 00378. See Deppes 
Exhibit 14. 
On January 5, 2001, Morgan and the Deppes executed an 
"Assumption Agreement" "in favor and for the benefit of" the 
Association. See Association Exhibit B. In the "Recitals" 
section of the Assumption Agreement it stated: 
Sellers are personally obligated to pay the special 
assessment. 
Buyers and Sellers have asked the [Association] to 
subordinate its lien to Buyer's first mortgage on the 
Encumbered Property in favor of Long Beach Mortgage 
Company in a sum not to exceed $177,650.00. 
Buyer has purchased or is about to purchase all or part 
of the Encumbered Property and desires to assume 
Sellers' obligation to [Association]. 
[Association's] consent to the subordination is 
conditioned upon (1) Buyer's unconditional assumption 
of the Sellers' obligations to the [Association] . . . 
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In the "Agreement Terms'' section of the Assumption Agreement 
it states in part: 
1. ASSUMPTION OF DEBT AND RELATED OBLIGATIONS 
Effective upon transfer of the Encumbered Property 
to Buyer, Buyer assumes all of sellers' 
obligations to [Association]. Buyer agrees to pay 
[Association] the unpaid principal balance and all 
interest accrued on special assessment described 
above in a timely manner. 
2. NO RELEASE - This agreement does not release the 
Seller (nor any other person) from liability to 
the [Association] for the special assessments. 
Above the Deppes signatures is the following: 
JOINDER AND CONSENT OF SELLERS 
The undersigned Sellers join in and consent to all 
the terms of this agreement and acknowledge that 
it does not alter their liability to the 
[Association]. The sellers acknowledge that 
[Association] has not agreed to release them from 
any of their obligations. 
The Deppes wanted the sale to happen and did not think that 
the Assumption Agreement was legally enforceable based upon a 
"gut feeling." See Deppes' memo, at xi-xii. Mr. Deppe read the 
Assumption Agreement before he signed it and "nowhere in the 
Assumption Agreement did it say he would pay the claimed 
Assessment." Id. at xii. When asked his understanding of the 
provision in the Assumption Agreement that states, "Sellers are 
personally obligated to pay the special assessment," Mr. Deppe 
responded, "I think that my interpretation of this is that we 
have - we have an obligation and we're not released from that 
obligation. But we do not in this document make a commitment to 
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pay that obligation. That would be Bryan Morgan's obligation." 
See Association memo, at 9-10. 
On January 20, 2001, the Association, through Greater Park 
City Properties, sent the Notice to its members by certified 
mail, notifying the members of the special assessment and stating 
that the claimed assessment was effective December 14, 2000. See 
Deppes Exhibit 13. This Notice was not sent to the Deppes 
because the Deppes had previously sold their condominium unit. 
The claimed assessment was to be paid in two installments, 
the first of which was due on February 28, 2001, and the second 
of which was due on June 28, 2001. See Deppes Exhibits 12 and 
13. The work on the renovations for which the claimed assessment 
was levied did not commence until at least late-spring or early 
summer of 2001. 
The special assessment on the condominium unit in the amount 
of $32,965.00 remains unpaid. 
LAW 
When both parties move for summary judgment, the court is 
not bound to grant it to one side or another. Diamond T. Utah,, 
Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 441 P.2d 705 (Utah 1968). 
Cross-motions for summary judgment do not warrant the court's 
granting of summary judgment unless one of the moving parties is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law upon facts that are not 




635 P.2d 53 (Utah 1981). 
A trial court may properly grant summary judgment when 
"there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56 (c). 
ARGUMENTS 
The Association argues that the Deppes are obligated to pay 
the claimed assessment pursuant to Utah Code § 57-8-20(2) and 
Article XIX(f) of the Declaration because they owned the property 
when the special assessment was made. Furthermore, the 
Association argues that the Deppes are jointly and severally 
liable with Morgan for all unpaid assessments pursuant to Utah 
Code § 57-8-25. Moreover, the Association argues that the Deppes 
are liable for the claimed assessment as acknowledged and agreed 
in the Assumption Agreement, which was not obtained by fraud, 
coercion, duress or mistake. The Association also argues that it 
is entitled to 18% interest per annum on the outstanding balance 
and attorney's fees. 
The Deppes argue that the vote on the claimed assessment is 
void because the Association failed to comply with the 
requirements of the Utah Nonprofit Corporation and Co-operative 
Association Act in effect in 2000 as set forth in Utah Code §§ 
16-6-18 through -112 (Nonprofit Act) and the Utah Condominium 
Ownership Act, Utah Code §§ 57-8-1 through -38 (Condominium Act). 
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Specifically, the Deppes argue that the Nonprofit Act required 
written consent signed by all members for the special assessment 
to occur without a meeting. The Deppes argue that Article XXVIII 
of the 1981 Declaration permitting voting by mail conflicts with 
the Nonprofit Act and is therefore void. Furthermore, the Deppes 
argue that they entered into a "binding contract for the sale of 
the subject condo, and the later purported imposition of the 
claimed assessment was invalid as to them." Moreover, the Deppes 
argue that they are not liable for the claimed assessment payment 
because by its own express terms it was not due or to become due 
until long after the Deppes sold and conveyed the condominium 
unit. Moreover, the Deppes are entitled to declaratory judgment 
that the Assumption Agreement is invalid and otherwise 
ineffective because it lacked consideration, they signed under 
duress, and fails to create any obligation on the part of Deppes 
to pay the claimed assessment. 
In reply, the Association argues that the Assumption 
Agreement obligates the Deppes because they acknowledged their 
outstanding debt and agreed to continue to be personally liable 
for the debt. The Association argues that the Assumption 
Agreement is valid and enforceable. There was consideration 
because the Buyer promised to assume all of the Deppes' 
obligations to the Association, the Deppes paid the $250 
attorney's fees and the lien was subordinated by the Association. 
-9-
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There was no duress. There was nothing shocking or unfair about 
the Assumption Agreement. The Buyer's-mortgage company requested 
it, not the Association, who was a third party beneficiary of the 
Assumption Agreement. Moreover, the Assumption Agreement is 
unambiguous. The Association also argues that the mail in voting 
for capital improvements was specifically authorized by the 1981 
Declaration and bylaws. The Association argues that the Deppes 
owned the condominium unit at the time of the assessment. The 
REPC did not pass title to the condominium unit to the buyer upon 
it acceptance. Rather, the REPC specifically states that the 
transaction is*not complete until closing. The REPC did not give 
possession of the condominium unit to Morgan until closing. 
Furthermore, the REPC places the entire risk of loss, including 
physical damage or destruction to property or improvements on the 
seller. 
DISCUSSION 
The first issue is whether the Association complied with the 
proper requirements to perform a mail-in vote. The Court is not 
persuaded by the Deppes argument that the Nonprofit Act and the 
Utah Condominium Ownership Act in effect in 2000 prohibited the 
mail in vote permitted by Article XXVIII of the 1981 Declaration. 
The Utah Condominium Ownership Act permits a condominium 
homeowner's association to create declarations. Where the 
declarations are silent, the Utah Condominium Ownership Act 
-10- 0443 
applies and where it is silent, then the Nonprofit Act applies. 
Here, the 1981 Declaration clearly permits a mail-in vote and 
does not require written consent signed by all members for the 
special assessment to occur without a meeting. Since the 1981 
Declaration is not silent on the issue, the two Acts referred to 
by the Deppes never come into play on the issue of mail-in 
voting. The 1981 Declaration governs the mail-in vote on the 
assessment. 
The next issue is whether the claimed assessment is an 
obligation of the Deppes. The Deppes argue that they sold the 
unit on December 13, 2000, the day before the claimed assessment 
was made. However, the Deppes had not sold the unit on December 
13, 2000, rather the Deppes had entered into an REPC. The sale 
of the unit closed on January 5, 2001. Even though the Deppes 
had entered into an REPC to sell the unit, clearly, the Deppes 
owned the unit until it was sold, i.e., the Deppes retained 
possession and bore the risk of loss on the unit until closing. 
The assessment made on December 14, 2000, was well before the 
Deppes closed on the sale weeks later. Pursuant to § 57-8-25 and 
Article XIX(f) of the 1981 Declaration, the Deppes, as the owners 
of the unit, were responsible for paying the claimed assessment. 
The next issue is whether the Deppes were responsible for 
paying the claimed assessment because such did not become due 
until after the unit was sold. Both § 57-8-25(2) and Article 
-11- 0444 
XIX(f) specifically provide that such charges against a unit are 
a debt or obligation of the owners of the unit "at the time the 
assessment is made" and is collectible as such. The assessment 
was made on December 14, 2000, and as stated above, the Deppes 
owned the unit on that date, therefore, the claimed assessment is 
a debt or obligation of the Deppes and is collectible against 
them. 
The final issue is how the assumption agreement affects the 
Deppes obligation. The Deppes argue that the assumption 
agreement should be declared invalid because it lacked 
consideration, was signed under duress and does not create an 
obligation on the part of the Deppes. There was consideration 
paid by the Deppes for the assumption agreement, $250, and the 
Deppes in turn were able to close on the sale of their unit. 
There was nothing that amounted to duress on the Deppes to sign 
the assumption agreement. They could have refused to sign and 
the sale may not have gone through that day, but this alone does 
not amount to duress. The Deppes wanted to sell the unit and in 
turn decided to sign the assumption agreement and pay $250. This 
does not amount to duress. The Deppes are correct in stating 
that the assumption agreement does not create the Deppes 
obligation to pay the claimed assessment. The Deppes obligation, 
as stated above, is derived from their ownership of the unit at 
-12- 044^ 
the time the claimed assessment was made.2 The Court concludes 
that the assumption agreement did not affect or change the Deppes 
obligation to pay the claimed assessment. 
Based upon the discussion above, the Court concludes that no 
genuine issues of material fact exist and the Association is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Court 
GRANTS the Association's motion for summary judgment and denies 
the Deppe's cross motion for summary judgment. 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no 
other order is required. 
DATED this Uf j day of August, 2005. 
2
 The Court notes that although the Deppes obligation is not 
derived from the assumption agreement, it does reflect the Deppes 
acknowledgment that they were obligated to pay the claimed 
assessment and knew they were not released from the obligation by 
selling the unit. For example, the assumption agreement states: 
"Sellers are personally obligated to pay the special assessment. 
. . . Buyer . . . desires to assume Sellers obligation to 
[Association]." The assumption agreement also declares that the 
Deppes are not released "from liability to the [Association] for 
the special assessment." And, that the Deppes "acknowledge that 
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ADDENDUM NO. 2 
WHEN RECORDED RETURN TO: 
James R. Blakesley 
Attorney at Law 
2595 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Phone No.: (801) 485-1555 
Fax No.: (801) 493-0111 
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ALAN SPRISGSi SUttMIT CO RECORDER 
2000 DEC 15 12:16 PH FEE $155.00 BY DMG 
REQUEST: JAKES R BLAKESLEY 
NOTICE OF SPECIAL ASSESSMENT 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
Please be advised that the Quality-Value Renovation-Repair Plan A with Funding Option No. I was 
approved a majority of the undivided ownership in the common areas and facilities at the PARK 
WEST CONDOMINIUM PROJECT. The total of the Special Assessment is $3,200,500.00. Since 
the particular sum due from each unit and unit owner and the method of payment varies, please 
contact Donna Van Buren, at Greater Park City Properties, P. O. Box 980845, Park City, Utah 
84098, Phone No.: (435) 649-0652 for specific information. The Special Assessment is effective 
on or about December 5, 2000. The Special Assessment is the debt of each unit owner and is 
collectible as such now. The Special Assessment affects the property and units at the PARK WEST 
CONDOMINIUM PROJECT described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto and incorporated herein by 
this reference. 





STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the /*f day of December, 2000, personally appeared before me, JAMES R. 
BLAKESLEY, who being by me duly sworn, did say that he is the attorney for the PARK WEST 
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION and that the wjtiiin and forgoing instrument was signed in behalf 
of said Association by authority of a resolution'ofthe Association. 
Public 
Residing at: Salt Lake City, Utah 




SIC, Utah 84104 
My Commission Expires 
February 14,2004 
Stum of Utah 
%Z¥d 
EXHIBIT MAM 
Tht ?rop«rty referred to in the Condominium Declaration to* which thii is 
attached aa an exhibit ia located in Sunit County, State of Utah and ia 
described aa follows: 
7MCIL A: 
Zeglnnlng at a point Korth 1560.29 feet and Vest 105.29 fete fron tht 
Southwtst corner of Section 31; TIS, R4E. Salt Lake Rase and Meridian, and 
xunnini thence S7c31kV 166.53 feet to a point on a 320.0 foot Tadlus curve; 
thtnee Horthwtsttrly along said curve 112.70 feet; thenee N78°48'V 152.95 ftet; 
theace V40e0OaV 226.35 feet; thence S64°08'V 212.10 feet; thence S2C°28,2SME 
123.00 feee; thence S71°30'V 104.58 fete; thence 1137*14'30"ff 224.88 feet; 
thtnee ?U8e28,40"U 89.02 feet; thtneo K50°00IC 278.30 feet; thence last 102.03 
feet; thtnee K30°00>£ 247.14 feet; thtnee S40oG0*E 100.70 feet; thenee K50o00(£ 
94.00 fiet; thtnee N57°00IE 113.34 ftet; thence S40°0OfE 157.32 feet; thenee 
S30°00'U 144.27 feet; thence S54°3rE 123.18 feet; thence S4°50'E 163.00 ftet 
to the point of beginning. 
mca at 
2Mtinning at a point Korth 2041.97 feet and Eant 98.47 fett froa tht 
Southwest corner of Section 31; T1S, IUE, Salt Lake Baae and Meridian, and 
running thtnee N40o00'E 168.00 feet; thence East 215.50 feet; thence North 
140.00 fttt; thenee last 325.08 fctt; thenetr South 153.12 feet; thence S23°05>W 
189.00 ftet; thenee S21°09,30ME 85.86 feet; thenee Southwesterly 481.86 feet 
along the are of 972.0 radius curve to the left (radius point S13°05,50,<E); 
thtnci Xcrthwoattrly 23.56 fttt along the are of 13.0 radius curve to the right 
(radius point K4l°30,W); thtnet N41°30'V 114.95 feet; thence Northwesterly 42.76 
fttt along the are of 290.0 radius curve to Che lefe (S48°30'V-Radius point); 
thtnee Northeasterly 22.53 fttt along tht arc of 15.27 radius curve to tht 
ltft (radius point K40o03»E); thenct 1U5°30,E 51.85 feet; thence N2°29,W 36.10 
fttt; thence S69°24'U 60.00 feet; thtnet N20°36,W 30.00 feet; thenee S69°24,V 
60.00 ftet; thence X20°36'V 117.30 feet; thence K69°24'E 60.00 feet; thtnee 
S2Q°36,E 30.00 feet; thtnee K69°24'E 60.00 feet; theneo H50°17,U 89.03 feet 
to the point of beginning. 
TOCETHEX VITHx 
An easeaenc for purpose of Ingress ind egress over that certai;. ..operty 
doscrlbed aa follows: 
-— Beginning at a point on the Westerly right of way line of Utah Highway 224, 
said point located Worth 1959.01 fett and East 1411.57 feet froa the Southwest 
corntr of Section 31; TIS, X4E, Salt Lake Base, and Meridian, and running thence 
80°13'X 119.30 feet along said Westerly right of way to a point on a 1058.68 * 
foot radius curve to the Ictt; thence Southerly along the are of said curve 
12.33 feet to a point on a reverse curve to the left, the radius point of 
which bears S89°06,54**V 30.00 feet; thence Northwesterly alone the are of said 
reverse curve 46.66 feet to a point of tangency; thenee Vest 457.95 feet to 
a point on a 900.00 foot radius curve to the left; thence Southwesterly along 
RECORDER'S NOTE 
LEGIBILITY OF WRITING. TYPING OR 
PRINTING UNSATISFACTORY IN THIS 
DOCUMENT vVHEN RECEIVED. 
the are of said curve 651.83 feet to a point of tancency; thence S48°38'U 
021*19 feet to a point on a 392.00 foot, radius curve to the right; thence 
Northwesterly along the ere of said curve 366,02 (cot to a point of tendency, 
thence N78°00«W 182.52 feet to a point on a 339.50 foot radius curve to the left; 
ihtnce Westerly along the .arc of said curve 201*46 feet to a point of reverse 
curvature} thince Westerly 125.87 feet along the arc of laid 1260.00 foot 
radius curve to the right the long chord of which bears S70°5i,42,,tf 125.83 feet; 
ihtnce N32°00'W 62.46 feet to a oolnt on a curve; thence Northeasterly 136.81 
feet along the arc of said 1200.00 foot radius curve to the left the long chord 
of which bears H71«51>28'*C 136.75 feet; thence Easterly 278*73 feet along the 
arc of a 469.70 foot radius curve to the right chord of which bears N8S°Q0'E 
274.63 feetf thsnee 3 78°00,E 143.27 feet*to A point on a 320.00 foot radius 
curve to the left; thence Northeasterly along the arc of said curve 298.79 feet 
to a point of tsn.tncy; lh.net N48°30IE 255.19 feet to a point on a 15.00 foot 
radius curve to the left; thence Northerly along the are of said curve 23.56 
feet to a point of tangency; thence N41°30'W 114.95 feet to a point on a 254.00 
foot radius curve to the left; thence Korthvesterly along the are of said curve 
117.48 fctt to a point of tangency; thence H68°00'U 76.72 feet to * point on a 
416.00 foot radius curve to the right; thence Northwesterly along the arc of 
said curve 203.29 fset to a point of tenancy; thence N40°Q0»W 57.5} feet; 
thtnctN5Qe00»E 36.00 feet; thenee S40°00»E 57.53 feet to a point on a 380.00 
foot radius curve to the left} thence Southeasterly along the are of said 
curve 1*55.70 feet to a point of tangency, thence S68°00,E 76.72 feet to a point 
on a 290.00 foot radius curve to the right;, thence Southeasterly along the are 
of said curve 134.13 feet to a point of tangency; thenee S4l°30«E 114.95 feet 
to a point on a 15*00 foot radius curve to the left; thenee Easterly along the 
are of said curve 23.56 feet to a point of reverse curvature on a 972.00 foot 
radius curve to the right; thence Easterly along the are of said curve 704.02 
feet to a point of tangency; thence East 457.38 feet to a point on a 30.00 foot 
radius curve to the left; thence Northerly along the are of aaid curve 47.24 
feet to the point of beginning. 
Exhibit "A" (Continued) 
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STATE OF UTAH 
County of Summit 
i ss. 
i, Aian Spriggs, County Recorder in and for Summit County. State of Utah, 
do hereby certify that the attached and foregoing is a full, true and correct copy 
of that certain ^ ^ L c
 Cy J ^ c J ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ - - T r 
which appears of record in my office in Book / ^ ^ Pnc\& /€«£% - /r.*?5 
being Entry No. S^J^ <CC/CK 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, i have hereunto set my hand and affixed my 
official seal, this / / ^ day o\Cc&r>Si? 20JjS_. 
r
 0 i 
o. 
Summit Courtly Rec&ixJer ' / 
